O discurso tem uma tónica importante nos consumidores e na prudência pela opção por 'standards'.
Quanto a estes, a comissária refere (e bem) que o mercado pode, por ele, vir a definir o 'standard'; pelo que não se deve forçá-lo a optar por um. Por outro lado, não esquece que se deve ter a maior atenção à existência de uma estandardização 'de facto' que deve ser regulada para a prevenção da 'prisão' dos consumidores.
Noutro ponto, a Comissária refere que a opção por um 'standard' proprietário só deverá acontecer quando as vantagens sejam uma realidade. Assim, sempre que possível deve haver uma preferência pelos sistemas não-proprietários, sem colocar em questão a pertinência do sistema de patentes.
O PITI aconselha a leitura da intervenção, mas aqui fica um pequeno resumo da mesma:
"It is simplistic to assume that because some intellectual property protection is good, that such protection should therefore be absolute in all circumstances.
It is simplistic to assume that because standardisation sometimes brings benefits, more standardisation will bring more benefits.
It is simplistic to assume that if the best approach is sometimes to base a standard on proprietary technology, then that is always the best approach.
And it is simplistic to assume that we can fix on a standard today, without paying attention to the risk of being locked-in tomorrow.
So what does this mean in practice?
First, we should only standardise when there are demonstrable benefits, and we should not rush to standardise on a particular technology too early.
Second, I fail to see the interest of customers in including proprietary technology in standards when there are no clear and demonstrable benefits over non-proprietary alternatives.
Third, standardisation agreements should be based on the merits of the technologies involved. Allowing companies to sit around a table and agree technical developments for their industry is not something that the competition rules would usually allow. So when it is allowed we have to look carefully at how it is done.
(...)
Fourth, if we extend intellectual property protection for technology, then we should only do so when it is justified under intellectual property principles, i.e. on the basis of evidence that such extension will lead to more innovations and will therefore promote consumer welfare.
Finally, if standards develop through customer preferences, most of the time, we should do nothing.
That stance may surprise you. But it is often wise to resist the impulse to regulate. If the proprietary technology initially appears to harm consumers more than it helps them, often the market will find a way out of the problem.
Of course, although I am a great believer in the market finding the right result, I am not naive. Sometimes intervention will be necessary.
When a market develops in such a way that a particular proprietary technology becomes a de facto standard, then the owner of that technology may have such power over the market that it can lock-in its customers and exclude its competitors.
(...)
In essence the competition authority has to recreate the conditions of competition that would have emerged from a properly carried out standardisation process.
There seem to me to be two possibilities and, depending on the case, either or both may be necessary.
First, the de facto standard could be subject to the same requirements as more formal standards(...)
In addition, where equivalent open standards exist, we could also consider requiring the dominant company to support those too.
Better, much better, than trying to sort out these problems, is preventing them from arising. And we all have a responsibility to ensure that this type of perpetual lock-in does not happen, and, where it does happen, we have a responsibility to minimise the damage.
(...)
And that is why the Commission has committed that:
(...)
When open alternatives are available, no citizen or company should be forced or encouraged to use a particular company's technology to access government information.
No citizen or company should be forced or encouraged to choose a closed technology over an open one, through a government having made that choice first.
These democratic principles are important.(...)"
comentário PITI
Se parte da intervenção não é directamente dirigida ao imbróglio Microsoft/OOXML, é certamente fácil ser-lhe aplicada.
Considero da maior utilidade não haver uma corrida à estandardização, até porque, como reconhece a Comissária, isto cria conflitos com o Direito da Concorrência. O fundamental é que no centro de tudo isto esteja o consumidor. Acredito que a definição pelo mercado do standard é a situação sempre preferível, estando o melhor para o desenvolvimento tecnológico assegurado. A liberdade do mercado deve ser o limite da regulação. Até aqui, a Comissão não deve ter receio de legislar.
Por fim, o IP:JUR refere algumas realidades no contexto comunitário que vão contra os princípios professados na intervenção.
Ver a intervenção na íntegra.
Ver o IP:JUR que alertou o PITI.
Ver o imbróglio Microsoft/OOXML aqui, fonte pouco imparcial mas informada.
Ver mais sobre estandardização aqui, aqui e aqui.
Noutro ponto, a Comissária refere que a opção por um 'standard' proprietário só deverá acontecer quando as vantagens sejam uma realidade. Assim, sempre que possível deve haver uma preferência pelos sistemas não-proprietários, sem colocar em questão a pertinência do sistema de patentes.
O PITI aconselha a leitura da intervenção, mas aqui fica um pequeno resumo da mesma:
"It is simplistic to assume that because some intellectual property protection is good, that such protection should therefore be absolute in all circumstances.
It is simplistic to assume that because standardisation sometimes brings benefits, more standardisation will bring more benefits.
It is simplistic to assume that if the best approach is sometimes to base a standard on proprietary technology, then that is always the best approach.
And it is simplistic to assume that we can fix on a standard today, without paying attention to the risk of being locked-in tomorrow.
So what does this mean in practice?
First, we should only standardise when there are demonstrable benefits, and we should not rush to standardise on a particular technology too early.
Second, I fail to see the interest of customers in including proprietary technology in standards when there are no clear and demonstrable benefits over non-proprietary alternatives.
Third, standardisation agreements should be based on the merits of the technologies involved. Allowing companies to sit around a table and agree technical developments for their industry is not something that the competition rules would usually allow. So when it is allowed we have to look carefully at how it is done.
(...)
Fourth, if we extend intellectual property protection for technology, then we should only do so when it is justified under intellectual property principles, i.e. on the basis of evidence that such extension will lead to more innovations and will therefore promote consumer welfare.
Finally, if standards develop through customer preferences, most of the time, we should do nothing.
That stance may surprise you. But it is often wise to resist the impulse to regulate. If the proprietary technology initially appears to harm consumers more than it helps them, often the market will find a way out of the problem.
Of course, although I am a great believer in the market finding the right result, I am not naive. Sometimes intervention will be necessary.
When a market develops in such a way that a particular proprietary technology becomes a de facto standard, then the owner of that technology may have such power over the market that it can lock-in its customers and exclude its competitors.
(...)
In essence the competition authority has to recreate the conditions of competition that would have emerged from a properly carried out standardisation process.
There seem to me to be two possibilities and, depending on the case, either or both may be necessary.
First, the de facto standard could be subject to the same requirements as more formal standards(...)
In addition, where equivalent open standards exist, we could also consider requiring the dominant company to support those too.
Better, much better, than trying to sort out these problems, is preventing them from arising. And we all have a responsibility to ensure that this type of perpetual lock-in does not happen, and, where it does happen, we have a responsibility to minimise the damage.
(...)
And that is why the Commission has committed that:
- for all future IT developments and procurement procedures, the Commission shall promote the use of products that support open, well-documented standards. Interoperability is a critical issue for the Commission, and usage of well-established open standards is a key factor to achieve and endorse it.
(...)
When open alternatives are available, no citizen or company should be forced or encouraged to use a particular company's technology to access government information.
No citizen or company should be forced or encouraged to choose a closed technology over an open one, through a government having made that choice first.
These democratic principles are important.(...)"
comentário PITI
Se parte da intervenção não é directamente dirigida ao imbróglio Microsoft/OOXML, é certamente fácil ser-lhe aplicada.
Considero da maior utilidade não haver uma corrida à estandardização, até porque, como reconhece a Comissária, isto cria conflitos com o Direito da Concorrência. O fundamental é que no centro de tudo isto esteja o consumidor. Acredito que a definição pelo mercado do standard é a situação sempre preferível, estando o melhor para o desenvolvimento tecnológico assegurado. A liberdade do mercado deve ser o limite da regulação. Até aqui, a Comissão não deve ter receio de legislar.
Por fim, o IP:JUR refere algumas realidades no contexto comunitário que vão contra os princípios professados na intervenção.
Ver a intervenção na íntegra.
Ver o IP:JUR que alertou o PITI.
Ver o imbróglio Microsoft/OOXML aqui, fonte pouco imparcial mas informada.
Ver mais sobre estandardização aqui, aqui e aqui.
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